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Abstract
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have a multitude of parliamentary duties and, accordingly, have to prioritize
some parliamentary activities over others. So far, we know comparably little about this prioritization process. Based on
principal–agent theory, we argue first, that MEPs’ parliamentary activities are systematically determined by the “visibil-
ity” and usefulness of parliamentary instruments for their key principal; second, we expect the exclusiveness of candidate
selection procedures of an MEP’s national party—the nomination and the final list placement—to determine her/his key
principal (i.e., elites or members of national parties). Combining multi-level mixed effects linear regression models and
expert interviews, we show that MEPs who are nominated and whose final list placement is decided by an exclusive circle
of national party elites prioritize speeches, whereas MEPs who are nominated or whose final list placement is decided by
more inclusive procedures prioritize written questions and opinions or reports. In other words, speeches seem particularly
useful to communicate with national party elites, while other activities are used to serve larger groups of party members.
These findings open up the black-box of the “national party principal” and illustrate how a complex principal–agent rela-
tionship stimulates very specific parliamentary activity patterns in the EU’s multi-level system.
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1. Introduction
Legislators have a large number of duties but only a lim-
ited amount of time. Therefore, they have to prioritize
someparliamentary activities over others. This is a partic-
ularly severe problem for the Members of the European
Parliament (MEPs). They act in amulti-level setting, have
to bridge large geographical distances and to serve mul-
tiple principals on different political levels. MEPs mainly
operate between their European Party Group (EPG) and
their national party (e.g., Hix & Høyland, 2014). The na-
tional party nominates candidates for (re-)election to
the European Parliament (EP) and is also instrumental
in elections for future domestic positions; the EPG con-
trols a range of offices and benefits within the EP, includ-
ing committee membership, chairmanships, positions in
the party group hierarchy, rapporteurships and speaking
time, and is therefore key to political success in parlia-
ment (Koop, Reh, & Bressanelli, 2018, p. 563; Kreppel,
2002). To disentangle this complex principal–agent rela-
tionship and its influence on MEPs’ prioritization strat-
egy in terms of parliamentary activities, we study the
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candidate selection procedure of national parties, which
is known to affect parliamentary activity in national set-
tings (Fernandes, Won, &Martins, 2019; for an overview
see Hazan, 2014). In doing so, we distinguish between
two steps—the nomination and the final decision on list
placement—in the candidate selection procedure of a
national party, and ask: Which parliamentary activities
do MEPs prioritize and how does the specific candidate
selection procedure (including nomination and final list
placement) of national parties influenceMEPs’ prioritiza-
tion strategy?
Based on the principal–agent theory, we argue that
MEPs’ prioritization strategy in terms of parliamentary
activities depends on the exclusiveness of candidate se-
lection procedures the MEPs’ national party employs
and, thus, on the key principal theMEP serves (i.e., party
elites, party members). The main reason for this is that
activities vary in their “visibility” and their utility to facili-
tate the interests of different principals (Klüver & Spoon,
2015). Some parliamentary activities are more suitable
to “cultivate a personal vote” and thus, to communicate
national or individual interests than others. Which spe-
cific interests an MEP wants to serve is determined by
two components of the candidates selectin procedure:
(1) the nomination of candidates; and (2) the decision
over the final list placement of candidates. Thus, both
components have an effect into the same direction, and
their combination determines the overall effect size of
candidate selection procedures on MEPs’ prioritization
strategy in terms of parliamentary activities.
We explore this novel argument based on a new
and comprehensive dataset that includes four important
but very different parliamentary activities (i.e., speeches,
written questions, written opinions, and reports) of all
MEPs, their personal characteristics and offices within
the 7th legislative period of the EP (2009–2014), as well
as expert interviews.
Overall, we find considerable support for our theo-
retical expectations: The choice to prioritize some par-
liamentary activities over others varies significantly with
the exclusiveness of candidate selection procedures of
national parties and thus, with the key principal a MEP
serves. In detail, if candidate selection processes are or-
ganized exclusively, MEPs tend to prioritize speeches;
if they are organized rather inclusively, MEPs tend to
engage more in written questions, opinions, or reports.
Furthermore, we show that exclusiveness of candidate
selection sometimes varies across the two stages of the
selection process, namely nomination and decision on
final list placement. Accordingly, it is essential to take
both stages into account when evaluating the impact
of candidates’ selection procedures onMEPs’ parliamen-
tary activities.
In consequence, this study contributes to key ques-
tions in two larger literature steams: First, it opens up the
black-box of the “national party principal” in the EP by ex-
ploring how variations along the inclusion–exclusion di-
mension in parties’ candidate selection procedures influ-
ence the type of activity MEPs engage. Thus, it clearly
speaks to the increasing “politics turn” in EU studies
(Braun, Gross, & Rittberger, 2020). Second, it speaks to
a growing comparative literature analyzing the link be-
tween candidate selection procedures in political par-
ties and legislative behavior. The focus of our research
is, therefore, a relevant one for both EU studies and
Comparative Politics. Finally, this is one of the first em-
pirical studies to comparatively investigate the conse-
quences of party recruitment procedures on the priori-
tization of parliamentary activities, namely across differ-
ent political parties in EU member states. The EP offers
an ideal testing ground, since elections are held simul-
taneously across the 28 EU member states but feature
a broad variety of different electoral rules. More impor-
tantly, all MEPs face similar procedural rules with regard
to each parliamentary activity, facilitating the compari-
son of parliamentary engagement.
The next section reviews the existing literature and
elaborates the theoretical framework. Subsequently, we
describe the measurement, data, and research design.
Next, we provide a descriptive overview of the dataset
and the most important relationships. Finally, we discuss
the results and provide some conclusions.
2. Prioritization of Parliamentary Activities in a
Multi-Level Setting: Exploring the Role of Political
Parties’ Selection Procedures
EU studies have extensively discussed the principal–
agent problems of MEPs. Many scholars who explore
the dilemma of managing two or more principals with
different interests focus on roll-call votes and, hence,
on an instance in which MEPs explicitly have to take
a position and where shirking this responsibility may
lead to sanctions imposed by one or the other princi-
pal (Faas, 2003; Hix, 2004; Koop et al., 2018; Lindstaedt,
Slapin, & van der Wielen, 2011; Meserve, Robbins, &
Thames, 2017). These scholars illustrate that MEPs and
especially EPGs behave in a more cohesive manner dur-
ing recorded votes than their party manifestos or ex-
pert surveys would predict (Hix & Høyland, 2013, p. 181).
However, when the EPG and the national party have dif-
ferent standpoints, MEPs are more likely to vote in line
with the position of their national party, particularly if
electoral rules promote a close relationship between the
latter actors (Faas, 2003; Hix, 2004;Meserve et al., 2017).
Even though research on the effect of multiple prin-
cipals on voting cohesion is extensive, we have little de-
tailed information on how this dilemma of serving mul-
tiple principals and the pressure to prioritize some tasks
over others affect MEPs’ parliamentary activities in ear-
lier stages of the legislative process. The few exceptions
focus mainly on speeches and written questions (Font
& Pérez Durán, 2016; Jensen, Proksch, & Slapin, 2013;
Proksch & Slapin, 2011; Slapin & Proksch, 2010; Wonka
& Rittberger, 2014), while other parliamentary activities
are largely disregarded (e.g., reports, opinions, motions
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for resolution). Speeches and written questions are usu-
ally exercised on an individual basis and therefore, re-
quire a relatively limited effort of coordination and time
compared to more substantial activities such as reports
or opinions. The latter activities are not only more time-
consuming but also more difficult to prioritize on an in-
dividual basis as the allocation of reports (and opinions)
follows a very complex procedure and requires strong
inter- and intra-party coordination (cf. EP, 2014, Title V,
Chapter 3–5). Beyond the comparably limited number of
studies exploring the principal–agent dilemma of MEPs
with regard to earlier stages of the legislative process,
no study so far—at least to our knowledge—offers a
broader overview of MEPs’ parliamentary activities and
hence, allows us to understand how this dilemma plays
out in MEPs’ prioritization strategies in terms of parlia-
mentary tasks and especially how it is related with the
candidates selection procedures of national parties.
The literature on legislative behavior in national set-
tings is very inspiring in that regard, as a growing num-
ber of scholars analyze the link between the candidate
selection processes of political parties and legislative be-
havior (for an overview see Hazan, 2014). Although this
community tends to concentrate on roll-call votes, it de-
votesmore attention toward individual parliamentary ac-
tivities and thus, provides a more fine-tuned picture of
the motives driving MPs’ individual behavior (for writ-
ten questions, see Martin, 2011; Rozenberg & Martin,
2011; for speeches see Bäck & Debus, 2016; Fernandes
et al., 2019). A general finding is that the more inclu-
sive the candidate selection process, the lower the level
of party unity because legislators are not only liable to
party leaders but also to a larger group of party mem-
bers. Moreover, candidate selection procedures seem to
predict legislative behavior more precisely than electoral
rules (Hazan, 2014, p. 219).
These insights provide valuable theoretical ground
for conceptualizing the effect of candidate selection pro-
cedures on different parliamentary activities in themulti-
level system of the EU: our overarching argument is that
the exclusiveness of candidate selection procedures of
national parties determines MEPs’ prioritization strategy
in terms of parliamentary instruments. In detail, we first
propose that someparliamentary activities aremore suit-
able to “cultivate a personal vote” and thus to commu-
nicate national or individual interests than others. The
main reason is that we assume parliamentary activities
to vary in their “visibility” and utility to respond to the
interests of different principals (Klüver & Spoon, 2015).
The contact of national party actors to the European
level is often ad hoc in nature (see Pittoors, 2020) and,
therefore, these actors are in general less attentive to-
wards European parliamentary activities than the EPG.
We assume that this attentiveness varies among national
party elites and national party members. National party
elitesmight bemuch better informedover legislative pro-
cesses in the EP due to the constant influx of EU legis-
lation and the extensive formal and informal coordina-
tion between the national party and its representatives
on the EU level. Members of national parties, by con-
trast, may find it much more difficult to monitor EP legis-
lation and might be more interested in very specific top-
ics affecting their electoral districts. However, this does
not mean that MEPs cannot directly serve national party
members; written questions, for instance, are a useful
tool to gather very specific but also very valuable infor-
mation for a large group of party affiliates. Accordingly,
we assume that not only the visibility but also the utility
of parliamentary instruments to communicate with na-
tional principals vary systematically across elites and in-
dividual members of the national parties. This leads us
to argue more generally that the exclusiveness of candi-
date selection procedures of a national party should af-
fect MEPs’ prioritization strategy in terms of parliamen-
tary instruments.
Second, we argue that the exclusiveness of candi-
date selection procedures should be captured along two
steps: (1) the nomination of candidates, and (2) the deci-
sion on list placement (cf. Fortin-Rittberger & Rittberger,
2015). Both steps are integral parts of the candidate se-
lection process, might be organized more exclusive or in-
clusive in manner and thus, determine the overall iden-
tity of the principal and the power the national party ex-
ercises in its role as principal over MEPs. Hence, the ef-
fect of both stages goes into the same direction and the
combination of both determines the overall effect size
of the exclusiveness of candidates’ selection procedures.
For instance,MEPs could be nominated by the party exec-
utive and the party executive could also take the decision
on the final list placement. Under these circumstances,
the candidates’ selection procedures are very exclusive
and thus, the incentive for MEPs to serve elites of the
national party is very strong. Alternatively, MEPs could
be nominated by the party executive but the decision
on the final list placement could be taken by many party
delegates. In this case, the overall exclusiveness of can-
didates’ selection procedures is intermediate in nature
and thus,MEPsmay try to communicate with both, party
elites and partymembers (for more details on the coding
of the respective variables, see Section 3).
In the following, we develop three specific expecta-
tions, theorizing in more detail on how the exclusive-
ness of the candidate selection procedures of national
parties affects MEPs’ prioritization of specific parliamen-
tary activities (i.e., speeches, written questions, and re-
ports/opinions).
First, we expect candidate selection procedures
within national political parties to impact on the speech-
making activity of MEPs. MEPs use speeches not only
to present policy plans in the plenary, but also to ex-
plain positions that deviate from either their EPG group
or their national party (Slapin & Proksch, 2010). Slapin
and Proksch established that speeches are a common in-
strument to demonstrate national loyalty because MEPs
may use this parliamentary instrument to “explain their
national party’s position to other members of their EP
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 72–84 74
political group, and to create a positive record for them-
selves in the eyes of the national party to serve their own
re-election” (Slapin & Proksch, 2010, p. 333).
For creating such a positive record in the eyes of
the national party, however, two questions are impor-
tant: (1)Who is listening to these speeches? (“visibility”);
and (2) who is able to substantially shape re-election
within the party? (“closeness” to the principals). First,
one could expect that political elites such as party lead-
ers or the executive committee are muchmore informed
about EU politics and especially about the activity of
the MEPs of their own party through different coordinat-
ing committees (e.g., Verbindungsbüros) than ordinary
party members. If these party elites have a strong say in
the candidate nomination procedure, meaning that the
process is rather exclusive, then it is highly likely that
MEPs would attempt to send positive signals to their
national principals through legislative speeches in order
to increase their chances of re-nomination. If the can-
didate selection process is organized more inclusively,
meaning that many individual or selected members are
involved in re-nomination and decision making over can-
didate lists, then it is rather unlikely that the messages
sent via speeches in the EP will reach the intended recip-
ients. Accordingly, MEPs aiming to communicate with in-
dividuals or selected groups of members should bemore
likely to engage in other activities than speeches. Based
on these reflections, we expect the following:
Expectation 1: The more exclusive the candidate se-
lection process for European elections within a na-
tional political party, the more likely it becomes that
MEPs prioritize speeches over other parliamentary
activities.
Furthermore, we argue that the candidate selection pro-
cedure also impacts MEPs’ prioritization strategies in
terms of written questions. Specifically, we expect that
the more exclusive the candidate selection process, the
less likely it becomes that MEPs systematically priori-
tize written questions over other parliamentary activi-
ties. Scholars detected that written questions serve na-
tional parties that are in the opposition by collecting
valuable information from the European Commission
(Wonka & Rittberger, 2014) or by alerting the European
Commission to failures of national governments in imple-
menting EU policy issues. Similarly, we argue that written
questions are a valuable tool also for individual MEPs.
Written questions can be used to raise important con-
cerns or gather very specific information being of local in-
terest or relevant for specific subnational groups. Hence,
they are useful to serve in particular individual mem-
bers of national parties or selected groups of party mem-
bers. The targeted (local) principal does not need to be
a fully attentive expert on EU politics when it comes
to parliamentary questions. The MEP or her/his assis-
tant can selectively disseminate the gathered informa-
tion. Moreover, written questions are hardly controlled
by EPG leadership or the leadership of the national party
in the EP, unlike most other activities. Furthermore, they
are particularly useful to capture individual prioritization
strategies of MEPs as proposing such questions requires
a certain amount of resources and time (e.g., a staffer
must research the question, format it appropriately, sub-
mit it, await a reply, and communicate this accordingly;
Martin, 2011, p. 263). Accordingly, we hypothesize:
Expectation 2: Themore exclusive the candidate selec-
tion process for European elections within a national
political party, the less likely it becomes that MEPs
prioritize written questions over other parliamentary
activities.
Finally, we do not expect the candidate selection proce-
dures of national parties to systematically affect MEPs’
prioritization strategy in terms of opinions and reports.
The allocation of opinions and reports follows a very
complex procedure, influenced by the power of indi-
vidual MEPs but also other factors such as expertise,
party group size, or seniority (Hix & Høyland, 2013, 2014,
p. 600). Thus, the prioritization of reports and opinions
is by no means an individual choice. Moreover, reports
and opinions might be visible to both the EPG and the
elites of the national party and, more importantly, it is
very difficult to push through specific national or party
interests, as both reports and opinions require the sup-
port of MEPs from other countries and national parties
(except if the national party is very large in number;
Mamadouh & Raunio, 2003). Similarly, obtaining a pow-
erful position within the EP (e.g., committee chair) re-
quires support from the EPG and thus, an engagement
with European ideas instead of national party-specific in-
terests. In others words, if we would expect any relation-
ship between the candidate selection process of national
parties and the time dedicated to reports or opinions,
then this relationship should be negative because other
instruments are less time consuming and may be more
effective to serve national principals (i.e., elites of a na-
tional party or party members). However, because of the
complex allocation procedure we do not expect any sys-
tematic relationship:
Expectation 3: Candidate selection procedures for
European elections within a national political party
are not systematically related to MEPs’ prioritization
strategies in terms of opinions and reports.
3. Research Design, Data, and Methods
This article analyzes the parliamentary activities of the
members of the 7th EP (2009–2014) and asks why MEPs
prioritize some activities over others. Accordingly, we are
interested inMEPs’ prioritization strategy in terms of par-
liamentary activities and not in the parliamentary pro-
ductivity of individual MEPs, nor do we compare the par-
liamentary productivity across MEPs. Instead, for all par-
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liamentary activities wemeasure the share of the respec-
tive activity of the total number of activities an individual
MEP engages in: speeches in plenary, written questions,
opinions, and drafted reports. We select these four ac-
tivities because they represent two “extremes” of clas-
sical parliamentary instruments: (1) Speeches and writ-
ten questions, for instance, encompass more “symbolic”
engagement, while following different logics, they can
be implemented on an individual basis, are less time
consuming and hence, useful for cultivating an individ-
ual profile that links up to national principals (Slapin &
Proksch, 2010); (2) opinions and reports, by contrast, rep-
resent more “substantive” activities (in terms of impact
on the legislative outcome), requiring a large effort of
coordination and time. Because of their political impor-
tance, the allocation of opinions and reports follows a
highly complex and political procedure (cf. EP, 2014, rules
49–56). Hence, the activities in focus are very different
in nature and require a different workload. However, we
argue that MEPs behave rationally and weigh all activi-
ties against each other when they distribute their time
(e.g., one report instead of many written questions). For
this reason, the dependent variable calculates the share
of each specific activity relative to the total amount of
all four activities. As a robustness check for this specific
selection, we run additional analyses using the activi-
ties’ share of all major activities documented by the EP
(this includes motions for resolutions and written decla-
rations additionally to the four activities mentioned; see
results in Table A7 in the Supplementary File). We ob-
tained the activity measures for 692 MEPs of the 7th EP
(2009–2014) from Vote Watch (2015).
In the following paragraphs, we summarize the cen-
tral independent variable, provide information on the
control variables and conclude with some descriptive
statistics (see Table 1). Our central independent variable,
“exclusive selection,” captures the exclusiveness of the
overall candidate selection process, including (1) candi-
date nomination (who nominates?), and (2) the deci-
sion over the final list placement of candidates (who de-
cides?). The exclusiveness of both components of can-
didate selection is measured in ordinal variables using
the following values: 1 (individualmembers); 2 (subset of
members); 3 (committee); and 4 (executive). Next, we in-
tegrate both components, assuming that the identity of
the selectorate taking the final decision on list placement
is more important to theMEP than the nominating selec-
torate (to test the impact of this assumption, we check
a different operationalization of the variable, results are
in Table A8 in the Supplementary File). So, the key de-
pendent variable, “exclusive selection,” takes the value
of: 1 if nomination and decision are inclusive; 2 if nom-
ination is exclusive but the decision inclusive; 3 if only
the decision is exclusive; and 4 if decision making is in
both stages is exclusive. The data has been collected and
shared by Fortin-Rittberger and Rittberger (2015). For an
additional robustness check, we create dummy variables
of both components of the candidate selection process:
1 if nominated/placed on the list by a committee or the
party executive; 0 if nominated/placed on the list by in-
dividual or a subset of members. The results of this test
are in Table A5 in the Supplementary File. Parties’ can-
didate selection rules may distinguish between the for-
mal right to propose a candidate—often the right of ev-
ery party member—and the right to propose a certain
order or list placement of the candidates—mostly done
by a party committee. To control for potential biases that
could arise from this, we leave out category 1 (individual
members) in the nomination variable (see result of this
robustness check in Table A6 in the Supplementary File).
To take the multi-level structure of our data into ac-
count, we run multi-level mixed effects linear regression
models with random intercepts at the level of the party
and of the EUmember state. As our dependent variables
(shares) are bounded between zero and 100, a linear re-
gression model could therefore possibly suffer from non-
normal errors and heteroscedasticity because of poten-
tial out-of-sample predictions. As a robustness check, we
run a fractional logit model (Papke & Wooldridge, 1996)
that was developed for the analysis of percentages (for
these results see Table A4 in the Supplementary File).
As the prioritization of some parliamentary activities
over others is influenced by many more factors, we in-
clude a large number of control variables. One of the
main control variables includes the electoral system of a
country, which is often used to identify power of the na-
tional party over the MEP. Specifically, we distinguish be-
tween “closed electoral systems,” where voters can only
vote for an electoral (party) list (1) and other systems (0;
see also Schwindt-Bayer & Mishler, 2005). We gathered
this data from Pilet et al. (2009). National opposition par-
ties might use their activities in the EP to control the do-
mestic agenda (Jensen et al., 2013). Hence, we include
a variable capturing how often the national party of the
MEP was not part of the national government (“Share in
National Opposition”), which is calculated by using the
number of government memberships of a party from
2009–2014 divided by the total number of governments
in the given time span (2009–2014), and subtracted
from one. Data on the composition of national govern-
ments in Europe originate from the ParlGov database
(Döring & Manow, 2019). It has been shown that na-
tional parties value MEPs from more powerful commit-
tees in European elections (Frech, 2018). Therefore, we
also control for “Committee Power.” This variable cap-
tures whether a MEP was part of a more powerful leg-
islative committee within the EP during the term (1) or
not (0). The classification of parliamentary committees
as more or less powerful is taken from Yordanova (2009;
see Table A1 in the Supplementary File). Some legislative
activities, speeches most importantly, are more likely
to be held by MEPs with certain offices. Hence, we ex-
pect “Committee Chairs” and other “EP Leadership” to
be more active in plenary sessions and therefore control
for these offices. “Committee Chair” is a binary variable
that takes the value of one if the MEP was chair of any
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of key variables.
Variable N Mean SD Min. Max.
(Share of) Speeches 692 62.90 21.65 3.13 100
(Share of) Written Questions 692 32.97 21.35 0 96.88
(Share of) Opinions 692 1.97 3.73 0 56.99
(Share of) Reports 692 2.15 3.98 0 46.51
Nomination (1 = 66, 2 = 89, 3 = 264, 4 = 79) 496 2.72 0.89 1 4
Decision List Placement (1 = 73, 2 = 129, 3 = 79, 4 = 298) 579 3.04 1.12 1 4
Exclusive Selection (1 = 91, 2 = 80, 3 = 54, 4 = 245) 470 3.02 1.19 1 4
Closed List (1 = 394) 691 0.57 0.495 0 1
Source: Authors’ calculations.
EP committee at any time during the legislative term and
“EP Leadership” takes the value 1 if the MEP was at least
a member of the conference of presidents or the EPs
Bureau during the term. Chairs of powerful committees
are more active than chairs of less powerful committees
and potentially writemore reports. Therefore, we also in-
clude an interaction between committee power and the
committee chair.
The “Participation Rate” of an MEP in plenary tells us
something about the ability of an MEP to engage in cer-
tain activities: A person who is absent during the plenary
sessions on a regular basis has less time for speeches, but
has potentially more time to write reports. When calcu-
lating the participation rate, MEPs who participated in
less than 10%of all plenary sessions are omitted. The vari-
able “EPG Left–Right Position” is an ordinal variable that
captures the ideological position of the EPG from left (1)
to right (7). The order is: European United Left–Nordic
Green Left (GUE/NGL), Progressive alliance of Socialists
and Democrats (S&D), Greens-European Free Alliance
(Greens/EFA), Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for
Europe (ALDE), European People’s Party (EPP), European
Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), and Europe of
Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD). We control for
the EPG’s ideological position on the left–right spectrum
to determinewhether left-wing party groups aremore ac-
tive andwhether theirmembers engage in different kinds
of activities. Further control variables are “Party Size,”
“Eurosceptic Party,” “Female,” “Age,” and “Seniority.”
“Party Size” captures the total number of MEPs who
are members of the same national party during the 7th
legislative term. “Eurosceptic Party” is a dummy vari-
able that captures whether or not the national party of
an MEP is considered Eurosceptic (coded 1 if the party
strongly opposes or opposes European Integration ac-
cording to the Chapel Hill Expert Survey [Polk et al., 2017];
a list of Eurosceptic parties can be found in Table A3 in
the Supplementary File). “Seniority” is measured by the
number of legislative periods the MEP previously served
in the EP. All information on personal characteristics of
MEPs we obtained from Hoyland, Sircar, and Hix (2009).
Finally, we conducted nine semi-structured expert
interviews to deepen our understanding of the un-
derlying dynamics linking MEPs’ prioritization strate-
gies in terms of parliamentary activities and candi-
date selection processes in national parties (for de-
tails, see Table A2 in the Supplementary File). We inter-
viewed MEPs from the Greens (very inclusive nomina-
tion) and from the Christian Democratic Party as well
as the Social Democratic Party in Germany (more in-
clusive candidate selection procedures). We also inter-
viewed members of the Socialist Party in France and
the Liberal Party in Germany (rather exclusive selec-
tion/nomination procedures).
4. Empirical Analysis
Overall, we observe that MEPs nominated by the na-
tional party executive speak more (66 speeches on av-
erage) than MEPs nominated through a more inclusive
process (MEPs nominated by selected party members or
delegates speak 62 times on average). Also, the average
number of written questions provides the first piece of
evidence that supports our second expectation: MEPs
nominated by the individual party members ask 33 ques-
tions on average, while MEPs nominated by the party ex-
ecutive only prepare 30 written questions. Furthermore,
the descriptive analysis of the data shows that the prior-
itization of parliamentary activities varies across groups
of MEPs: Female MEPs are more active in writing opin-
ions (1.70 for male MEPs vs. 2.47 for female MEPs), and
the members of the right-wing Eurosceptic EPG (EFD) on
average ask the most written questions (44 in total) but
are significantly less active in more substantial activities
(about 0.34 opinions and 0.36 reports on average).While
German MEPs for example draft more than four reports
on average, Estonian MEPs write only 0.68 reports.
These descriptive insights are further substantiated
and supported by the results of several multi-level mixed
effects linear regression models that analyze the effect
of the overall exclusiveness of the candidate selection
procedure a party employs (see Table 2) and the effect
of the two stages (i.e., nomination and decision on fi-
nal placement decision) of the selection procedure sep-
arately (see Table 3). Models 1 and 5 focus on the prior-
itization of speeches relative to other parliamentary ac-
tivities and show a positive and significant effect of the
parties’ candidate selection process as a whole as well
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Table 2. The effect of exclusive candidate selection on activities in the EP (2009–2014).
Model: 1 2 3 4
Dep. Var.: Speeches Written Questions Opinions Reports
Exclusive Selection 3.957** −2.986* −0.453** −0.514**
(1.331) (1.258) (0.175) (0.183)
Closed List Systems 6.506 −4.618 −0.277 −0.456
(5.517) (5.756) (0.476) (0.504)
Share in −13.24*** 13.23*** 0.359 −0.930
National Opposition (4.006) (3.732) (0.707) (0.753)
Eurosceptic −8.441 8.051 −0.804 −0.467
(6.445) (5.971) (1.182) (1.266)
Party Size −0.329+ 0.181 0.0464+ 0.0379
(0.179) (0.162) (0.025) (0.026)
Female −0.442 −0.132 0.968* −0.279
(1.590) (1.582) (0.384) (0.420)
Committee Power −3.119+ 2.090 −0.174 1.315**
(1.619) (1.611) (0.393) (0.431)
Committee Chair −2.160 −4.549 −0.0330 5.791**
(6.525) (6.508) (1.610) (1.766)
Com. Chair * Power −3.587 2.712 6.735*** −4.447*
(7.789) (7.759) (1.921) (2.106)
EP Leadership 20.12*** −17.29*** −0.457 −1.820*
(3.426) (3.407) (0.824) (0.902)
Participation Rate 0.249** −0.164+ −0.00488 −0.0580**
(0.086) (0.085) (0.020) (0.022)
Seniority 0.778 −0.755 −0.362+ 0.347+
(0.802) (0.795) (0.185) (0.201)
Age −0.0697 −0.0249 0.0425* 0.0346+
(0.078) (0.078) (0.018) (0.020)
EPG Left-Right 0.389 −0.0919 −0.0295 −0.140
Position (0.714) (0.662) (0.127) (0.134)
Constant 42.19*** 48.32*** 1.612 6.614**
(10.991) (10.807) (2.253) (2.447)
N 456 456 456 456
Ll −1924.7 −1921.8 −1260.0 −1301.3
Notes: Coefficients of multilevel linear regression models with random effects at the level of the national party and at the EU member
state. Standard errors are in parentheses. leg.: legislative. Significance levels: + p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
as of both stages. In detail, the more elite-dominated
the candidate selection processes of MEPs within a na-
tional political party, the more time MEPs dedicate to
speech-making activities. Figure 1 illustrates this pat-
tern graphically by disentangling the relationship be-
tween the exclusiveness of candidate nomination proce-
dures and speech-making activity. Ourmodels predict 58
speeches for MEPs that are nominated by a large num-
ber of individual party members and a mean of almost
69 speeches for MEPs being nominated by a very exclu-
sive cycle. These strong findings support our first theoret-
ical expectation, proposing that speeches are particularly
useful to communicate with the national party (Slapin
& Proksch, 2010) and, specifically, more effective for a
small group of party executives than a large number of
party members.
Our second expectation, proposing a systematic re-
lationship between candidate selection procedure and
MEPs engagement in written questions, also finds sup-
port. Models 2 and 6 show that the more exclusive the
candidate nomination procedures within national par-
ties, the fewer written questions MEPs of these par-
ties tend to propose. However, only the second stage
of the candidate selection procedure, namely the exclu-
siveness of the decision on the final list placement of
candidates, shows an effect that is statistically signifi-
cant. These results are supported by evidence from the
interviews. One interview partner, who is a member of
the Social Democratic Party in Germany, whose candi-
date nomination and selection process is quite inclusive
(a subset of members nominates and decides over nom-
ination), explains:
[I] submit written questions, if I am asked for by any-
body; especially, local actors or groups. For instance,
that was the case with Opel. As Opel wanted to re-
locate a factory [from Germany] to other European
countries, I should prepare a written question to
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Table 3. The effect of nomination and list placement decision on activities in the EP (2009–2014).
Model: 5 6 7 8
Dep. Var.: Speeches Written Questions Opinions Reports
Nomination List 2.633+ −1.889 −0.459* −0.337
(1.453) (1.370) (0.233) (0.249)
Decision List Placement 3.057* −2.255+ −0.290 −0.507*
(1.320) (1.264) (0.197) (0.208)
Closed List Systems 4.756 −3.377 −0.0402 −0.393
(5.730) (5.954) (0.511) (0.540)
Share in −12.60** 12.75*** 0.233 −0.900
National Opposition (4.128) (3.873) (0.727) (0.773)
Party Size −8.139 7.691 −0.640 −0.386
(6.486) (6.031) (1.194) (1.274)
Eurosceptic Party −0.321+ 0.175 0.0476+ 0.0467+
(0.185) (0.169) (0.026) (0.027)
Female −0.518 −0.0585 0.948* −0.290
(1.586) (1.579) (0.384) (0.421)
Committee Power −2.906+ 1.910 −0.191 1.271**
(1.618) (1.610) (0.393) (0.431)
Committee Chair −2.121 −4.588 −0.0272 5.814***
(6.517) (6.502) (1.610) (1.764)
Com. Chair * Power −3.812 2.904 6.820*** −4.396*
(7.780) (7.755) (1.920) (2.103)
EP Leadership 20.08*** −17.24*** −0.418 −1.773*
(3.429) (3.414) (0.825) (0.902)
Participation Rate 0.251** −0.165+ −0.00715 −0.0601**
(0.086) (0.085) (0.020) (0.022)
Seniority 0.775 −0.756 −0.338+ 0.337+
(0.802) (0.795) (0.187) (0.203)
Age −0.0713 −0.0235 0.0416* 0.0358+
(0.078) (0.078) (0.018) (0.020)
EPG Left-Right 0.270 −0.00524 −0.0464 −0.131
Position (0.725) (0.674) (0.130) (0.136)
Constant 38.72*** 50.53*** 2.573 7.495**
(11.556) (11.358) (2.403) (2.608)
N 456 456 456 456
Ll −1924.5 −1921.8 −1259.9 −1300.9
Notes: Coefficients of multilevel linear regression models with random effects at the level of the national party and at the EU member
state. Standard errors are in parentheses. leg.: legislative. Significance levels: + p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001.
the Commission, asking whether Opel has already re-
quested project funds for the construction of a new
plant in other European countries. [I prepare written
questions to the Commission], if I am addressed from
outside: “Can you even check with the Commission if
this and that is the case?” (Interview 07)
In other words, written questions seem to be an impor-
tant instrument for MEPs who serve a larger group of se-
lectedmembers within their national party because writ-
ten questions can be used to gather very specific but still
highly important information for this specific group. The
idea that written questions can be used to serve individ-
ual or a particular group of members is also graphically
visible in Figure 1b: The predicted effects for the relative
share of written questions MEPs propose is higher for
more inclusive selectorates.
Models 3 and 7 as well as 4 and 8 display the effect
of the exclusiveness of candidate selection procedures
on the share of opinions and reports drafted by MEPs.
Overall, highly exclusive candidate selection procedures
in national parties seem to hamper the prioritization
of opinions and reports, (see for a graphical overview
Figures 1c, 1d). Looking at both stages of selection sepa-
rately, we observe a more nuanced pattern. While nom-
ination has a larger, significant effect on drafting opin-
ions, the placement decision stage has a clear effect on
reports. One of our interview partners explains the gen-
eral phenomenon as follows:
But look, you can secure your re-election in such a
party, by profiling yourself almost only party politi-
cally; [you] can knit your network in a way you will
definitely get higher in the next election, although you
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Figure 1. Predicted effects of exclusive candidate selection on the prioritization of different activities. (a) Predictivemargins
of exclusive selection on speeches with 95% confidence intervals, (b) Predictivemargins of exclusive selection on questions
with 95% confidence intervals, (c) Predictive margins of exclusive selection on written opinions with 95% confidence in-
tervals, (d) Predictive margins of exclusive selection on reports drafted with 95% confidence intervals. Source: Authors’
predictions; data on national parties’ candidate nomination procedures from Fortin-Rittberger and Rittberger (2015).
do not work so much content-wise [i.e., drafting re-
ports or opinions]…Or you are strategically smart and
just make one report, that brings a lot of public at-
tention…Then you have to do something, but not so
much. (Interview 01)
In other words, if an MEP is elected in a national party
that organizes its nomination and list placement process
exclusively, the national party elite is the key principal for
the MEP and, thus, a large number of reports and opin-
ions might not be the most effective way to serve the
key principal (cf. Interview 02). Instead, it seems wise to
take over relevant tasks in Strasbourg, for instance, orga-
nizing the communication between national party elites
and MEPs on different policy issues. The EPG is a central
gatekeeper for report allocation (Hix & Høyland, 2013,
p. 182) and, thus, another principal that might challenge
the implementation of the specific interests of individ-
ual national parties. However, MEPs that are used to ac-
commodate the preferences of diverse national party col-
leagues due to very inclusive candidate selection proce-
dures are perhaps better prepared and may find more
freedom in negotiating policy deals with colleagues in
Strasbourg, which is key for the formulation of reports.
The assistant of a Spanish MEP explained in that regard:
It is like that “Ok, you will get the report, but please
take into account what I am going to tell you in the
coming month” or something like that. It is trying to
find a way to work together and to get a good result.
(Interview 09)
In addition to the exclusiveness of candidate selection
procedures in national parties, other control variables af-
fect outcomes. For instance, committee power and com-
mittee chairing are highly important for the prioritization
of reports. For the prioritization of written questions, the
opposition status of the national party is key and thus,
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again, a variable that has been detected as relevant by
other studies (Jensen et al., 2013; Wonka & Rittberger,
2014). Interestingly, members of the national opposi-
tion prioritize speeches less systematically than other
MEPs, indicating that speeches in the EP are less use-
ful to follow a blaming strategy directed at national gov-
ernments (for more details on blaming strategies of op-
position parties in the EU multi-level system, see in this
issue Heinkelmann-Wild, Kriegmair, & Rittberger, 2020).
Furthermore, individual speech-making activity is addi-
tionally stimulated by the power position and participa-
tion rates of MEPs. As MEPs can only speak or vote while
sitting in plenary, it is not surprising that the participa-
tion rate in plenary is positively associated with the pri-
oritization of speeches but hampers the engagement in
other activities. Additionally, more senior MEPs do not
necessarily follow other priority patterns than less expe-
rienced MEPs. However, our results reflect that seniority
is important for the distribution of opinions and reports.
Lastly, MEPs elected in countries with a closed-list sys-
tem are likely to give a relatively large share of speeches
but propose a comparably low share ofwritten questions.
Although the effects are not significant, the finding is in
line with the basic argument of this article as well as the
findings of previous studies using closed-list systems as a
proxy for a close relationship betweenMEPs and national
parties (Slapin & Proksch, 2010).
In sum, these results provide support for our gen-
eral argument and for the two specific expectations in
terms of speeches and written questions. Different than
proposed in Expectation 3, however, candidates’ selec-
tion procedures of national parties indeed seem to influ-
ence MEPs’ prioritization strategies in terms of reports
and opinions in a negative way. This finding supports the
general idea that MEPs have to prioritize parliamentary
tasks and if they face an exclusive selection procedure,
they are more likely to shift their focus away from re-
ports or opinions towards activities that are more visible
and suitable to serve the national or party leaderships´
interests. However, these findings might be influenced
by many more factors, as the allocation of reports and
opinions follows a complex process. Yet in sum, our gen-
eral argument finds strong support: The candidate selec-
tion processes of national parties seem to determine the
key principal MEPs serve and, thus, MEPs’ prioritization
strategy in terms of parliamentary instruments because
some parliamentary activities aremore “visible” and suit-
able to “cultivate a personal vote” and to communicate
national or individual interests than others.
5. Conclusion
The question of how European legislators deal with mul-
tiple principals and a variety of parliamentary tasks is
highly interesting because it concerns central standards
of modern democracies, namely political representation
and responsiveness. MEPs are the key actors in transmit-
ting the interests of European citizens to the suprana-
tional level and thus, may substantially increase the legit-
imacy of EU decisions. Hence, an analysis of MEPs’ priori-
tization strategy of parliamentary activities and how this
process is linked with candidate selection procedures of
national parties is highly fruitful as it allows us to disen-
tangle the complex principal–agent relationship in the
EU’s multi-level system and to understand how electoral
rules in political parties shape political responsiveness.
Moreover, these findings are essential for the current po-
litical plans of building up a transnational party system
(cf. this issue Lefkofridi, 2020).
We discover that the more exclusive (i.e., elite-
centered) candidate selection procedures of national
parties, the more likely it becomes that MEPs priori-
tize speeches over other parliamentary activities; con-
versely, the more inclusive (i.e., member-centered) the
candidate selection procedures, the more likely it is that
MEPs prioritize written questions as well as opinions
and reports. A main reason for these differences is the
varying “visibility” of parliamentary activities to differ-
ent principals (Klüver & Spoon, 2015) and thus, the vary-
ing utility of parliamentary activities to serve the differ-
ent principals. Furthermore, our analysis discovers that
it is worth distinguishing between two steps of candi-
date selection in national parties, namely nomination
and decision on the final list placement because both
steps may vary in their degree of exclusiveness and may
therefore both affect the overall closeness of MEPs to
their specific national party principals (i.e., party elites
or party members).
Our insights complement existing studies in two in-
novative ways: (1) theoretically, by conceptualizing na-
tional parties not as “monolithic” principal but as con-
glomerations of groups of party members with different
preferences; and (2) empirically, by focusing on the EP,
which offers an ideal testing ground to compare candi-
date selection procedures and parliamentary activities,
since elections are held simultaneously across the 28 EU
member states but feature a broad variety of electoral
rules and, more importantly, all MEPs face similar proce-
dural rules with regard to parliamentary activity, facilitat-
ing any comparison.
Besides these innovative findings, our study also
faces someweaknesses. We detect a systematic relation-
ship between candidate selection rules and the prioriti-
zation of parliamentary activities of MEPs, and explain it
with the visibility to and utility of certain actions for spe-
cific selectorates. Even though we have some evidence
for this explanation from the expert interviews, a future
article will have to prove the visibility of each legisla-
tive instrument to the different selectorates in more de-
tail. Furthermore, we note a point related to the oper-
ationalization of the dependent variables, which mea-
sure the relative share of each type of activity of the
total number of activities engaged in by MEPs: this is
a strictly quantitative approach that does not consider
the content nor the relative time required to prepare
each activities. Moreover, it disregards activities of MEPs
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outside the parliamentary arena (i.e., organizing events
at the state/local level for their constituencies or party
members) which also might be used to serve elites or
members of their national parties. Capturing this extra-
parliamentary activity in a systematic way would be
highly promising to push this research agenda ahead.
Finally, it would be fruitful to explore our argument in
depth for Eurosceptic parties as their core-topics are
European integration and European immigration, which
might stimulate party members to be more attentive to-
wards their representatives’ activities in the EP and sim-
ilarly, bias MEPs’ prioritization strategies towards parlia-
mentary activities that are most compatible with pop-
ulist communication strategies.
Overall, however, this article makes an important
contribution as first, it opens up the black-box of the “na-
tional party principal” in the EP by exploring how vari-
ations along the inclusion–exclusion dimension in party
candidate selection procedures influence the type of
activity MEPs engage. Second, it speaks to a growing
comparative literature analyzing the link between party
candidate selection procedures and legislative behavior.
Besides this cross-cutting scientific relevance, this study
is also of societal relevance as it illuminates the channels
through which national and sub-national party interests
could enter EP politics and thus, increase the legitimacy
of EU policy-making.
Acknowledgments
The authors gratefully acknowledge the ideational and
the financial support of the Swiss National Science
Foundation (SNF), the SNF-project “Parliamentary
Careers in Comparison” [Grant No. 100017L-162427]
and the LMU Mentoring Program for excellent PostDocs.
We thank the guest editors of the Thematic Issue, as
well as Zoe Lefkofridi, Simon Hug, Sarah Dingler, Stefanie
Bailer, Tomas Turner-Zwinkels, and the three anonymous
reviewers for their valuable feedback on this article.
Conflict of Interests
The authors declare no conflict of interests.
Supplementary Material
Supplementarymaterial for this article is available online
in the format provided by the authors (unedited).
References
Bäck, H., & Debus, M. (2016). Political parties, parlia-
ments and legislative speechmaking. London: Pal-
grave Macmillan.
Braun, D., Gross, M., & Rittberger, B. (2020). Political be-
havior in the EU multi-level system. Politics and Gov-
ernance, 8(1), 1–5.
Döring, H., & Manow, P. (2019). Table view_cabinet.
Parliaments and governments database (ParlGov).
Retrieved from http://www.parlgov.org/data/table/
view_cabinet
European Parliament. (2014). Rules of procedure of the
European Parliament (8th parliamentary term). Stras-
burg: European Parliament.
Faas, T. (2003). To defect or not to defect? National, in-
stitutional and party group pressures on MEPs and
their consequences for party group cohesion in the
European Parliament. European Journal of Political
Research, 42(6), 841–866. https://doi.org/10.1111/
1475-6765.00106
Fernandes, J. M., Won, M., & Martins, B. (2019). Speech-
making and the selectorate: Persuasion in nonprefer-
ential electoral systems. Comparative Political Stud-
ies. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.
1177/0010414019858964
Font, N., & Pérez Durán, I. (2016). The European Par-
liament oversight of EU agencies through written
questions. Journal of European Public Policy, 23(9),
1349–1366. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.
2015.1076875
Fortin-Rittberger, J., & Rittberger, B. (2015). Nominat-
ing women for Europe: Exploring the role of polit-
ical parties’ recruitment procedures for European
Parliament elections. European Journal of Political
Research, 54(4), 767–783. https://doi.org/10.1111/
1475-6765.12101
Frech, E. (2018). Re-selecting members of the European
Parliament: Candidate selection, party goals, and re-
election probabilities. Wiesbaden: Springer VS.
Hazan, R. Y. (2014). Candidate selection: Implications
and challenges for legislative behaviour. In S. Martin,
T. Saalfeld, & K. Strøm (Eds.), The Oxford handbook
of legislative studies (pp. 213–231). Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Heinkelmann-Wild, T., Kriegmair, L., & Rittberger, B.
(2020). The EU multi-level system and the Euro-
peanization of domestic blame games. Politics and
Governance, 8(1), 85–94.
Hix, S. (2004). Electoral institutions and legislative be-
havior: Explaining voting defection in the European
Parliament. World Politics, 56(2), 194–223. https://
doi.org/10.1353/wp.2004.0012
Hix, S., & Høyland, B. (2013). Empowerment of the
European Parliament. Annual Review of Political
Science, 16(1), 171–189. https://doi.org/10.1146/
annurev-polisci-032311-110735
Hix, S., & Høyland, B. (2014). Political behaviour in the
European Parliament. In S. Martin, T. Saalfeld, &
K. Strøm (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of legislative
studies (591–609). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199653010.
013.0021
Jensen, C. B., Proksch, S.-O., & Slapin, J. B. (2013). Par-
liamentary questions, oversight, and national oppo-
sition status in the European Parliament. Legislative
Studies Quarterly, 38(2), 259–282. https://doi.org/
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 72–84 82
10.1111/lsq.12013
Klüver, H., & Spoon, J.-J. (2015). Bringing salience back
in. Party Politics, 21(4), 553–564. https://doi.org/10.
1177/1354068813487114
Koop, C., Reh, C., & Bressanelli, E. (2018). When pol-
itics prevails: Parties, elections and loyalty in the
European Parliament. European Journal of Political
Research, 57(3), 563–586. https://doi.org/10.1111/
1475-6765.12252
Kreppel, A. (2002). The European Parliament and supra-
national party system: A study in institutional devel-
opment. Cambridge studies in comparative politics.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lefkofridi, Z. (2020). Competition in the European arena:
How the rules of the game help nationalists gain. Pol-
itics and Governance, 8(1), 41–49.
Lindstaedt, R., Slapin, J. B., & van derWielen, R. J. (2011).
Balancing competing demands: Position taking and
election proximity in the European Parliament. Leg-
islative Studies Quarterly, 36(1), 37–70. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1939-9162.2010.00003.x
Mamadouh, V., & Raunio, T. (2003). The committee
system: Powers, appointments and report alloca-
tion. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies,
41(2), 333–351. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5965.
00425
Martin, S. (2011). Parliamentary questions, the be-
haviour of legislators, and the function of legislatures:
An introduction. The Journal of Legislative Studies,
17(3), 259–270. https://doi.org/10.1080/13572334.
2011.595120
Meserve, S., Robbins, J., & Thames, F. (2017). Multi-
ple principals and legislative cohesion. Legislative
Studies Quarterly, 42(4), 515–548. https://doi.org/
10.1111/lsq.12165
Papke, L. E., & Wooldridge, J. M. (1996). Econometric
methods for fractional response variables with an
application to 401(k) plan participation rates. Jour-
nal of Applied Econometrics, 11(6), 619–632. https://
doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-1255(199611)11:6<619:
:AID-JAE418>3.0.CO;2-1
Pilet, J.-B., Kolarova, R., Shopov, V., Braun, M., Beneš, V.,
Karlas, J., . . . Boromisa, A.-M. (2009). The selection of
candidates for the European Parliament by national
parties and the impact of European political par-




Pittoors, G. (2020). Living apart together? The organiza-
tion of political parties beyond the nation-state: The
Flemish case. Politics and Governance, 8(1), 50–60.
Polk, J., Rovny, J., Bakker, R., Edwards, E., Hooghe, L.,
Jolly, S., . . . Zilovic, M. (2017). Explaining the salience
of anti-elitism and reducing political corruption for
political parties in Europe with the 2014 Chapel Hill
Expert Survey data. Research & Politics, 4(1). https://
doi.org/10.1177/2053168016686915
Proksch, S.-O., & Slapin, J. B. (2011). Parliamentary ques-
tions and oversight in the European Union. European
Journal of Political Research, 50(1), 53–79. https://
doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.2010.01919.x
Rozenberg, O., & Martin, S. (Eds.). (2011). The role
and function of parliamentary questions: An assess-
ment. The Journal of Legislative Studies [Special is-
sue], 17(3), 394–404.
Schwindt-Bayer, L. A., & Mishler, W. (2005). An inte-
grated model of women’s representation. The Jour-
nal of Politics, 67(2), 407–428. https://doi.org/10.
1111/j.1468-2508.2005.00323.x
Slapin, J. B., & Proksch, S.-O. (2010). Look who’s talking:
Parliamentary debate in the European Union. Euro-
pean Union Politics, 11(3), 333–357. https://doi.org/
10.1177/1465116510369266
VoteWatch. (2015). VoteWatch Europe. VoteWatch. Re-
trieved from https://www.votewatch.eu
Wonka, A., & Rittberger, B. (2014). The ties that bind?
Intra-party information exchanges of German MPs
in EU multi-level politics. West European Politics,
37(3), 624–643. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.
2013.830472
Yordanova, N. (2009). The rationale behind committee
assignment in the European Parliament: Distribu-
tive, informational and partisan perspectives. Euro-
pean Union Politics, 10(2), 253–280. https://doi.org/
10.1177/1465116509103377
About the Authors
Eva-Maria Euchner is a Post-Doctoral Researcher at the Political Science Department of the Ludwig
Maximilian University ofMunich. She is specialized in comparative public policy analysis and legislative
behavior. Her current research interest lies at the intersection between religion, gender, and morality
politics in the EU’s multi-level system. Eva-Maria’s work has been published in the Journal of European
Public Policy, Parliamentary Affairs, Regulation & Governance and with Oxford University Press.
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 72–84 83
Elena Frech is a Post-Doctoral Researcher at the Department of Political Science and International
Relations of the University of Geneva (Switzerland), in the “Parliamentary Careers in Comparison”
project. She is interested in the European Union, in particular the European Parliament, and legislative
and comparative politics. In particular she specializes in political parties, especially party behavior and
decisionmaking, public opinion, and political recruitment. She is furthermoreworking on international
political economy topics and multi-level governance. Her work has been published in International
Organization, European Politics, and other journals.
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 1, Pages 72–84 84
